CVE-2026-100650

vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact.

• https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34Patch
• https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-p6g9-7v3x-m8mvExploit
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-before-0.29.0-resource-exhaustion-via-unbounded-media-materializationThird Party Advisory
• https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-p6g9-7v3x-m8mvExploit