CVE-2026-70357

Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess.

• https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0/
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-p3pc-g8m5-hrrr