CVE-2026-92289

Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in "PKCE or secret" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret. With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present. An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user's access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.

• https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/releases/v2.23.4
• https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/25/2
• https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719