CVE-2026-92595

Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using the documented legacy three-argument signature `resolveContent(data, key, callback)`. Because `shared.resolveContent()` normalizes the missing `options` argument to an empty object, the message-level flags copied into `mail.data` by the MailMessage constructor are discarded, and `resolveContentValue()` skips both access-control checks, reaching `nmfetch(url)` or `fs.createReadStream(path)`. As a result, plugin or application code that resolves untrusted message content (html, text, attachment `path` or `href`) via this API can be induced to read arbitrary local files or issue outbound HTTP(S) requests (server-side request forgery), bypassing the sandbox the application enabled. The internal paths used by `transporter.sendMail()` (`resolveAll()`, `_convertDataImages()`, and the MIME streaming path) are not affected. Fixed in version 9.1.1.

• https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-before-9.1.1-security-sandbox-bypass-via-resolvecontent
• https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj